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Abstract 
MallyfirlJ7s in the pharmacelltical indllstlY tum to acquisitiolls when faced 
with gaps in their dmg development pipelines and patent expirations as an 
alternative to making long-term investments in internal research and development. 
Illvestors are generally negative on this strategy, and upon the announcement qf a 
pharmaceutical acquisition the stock ~fthe acquiringjirm (ifiell drops. this decline 
ill share price creates an opportunityfor the investor who can ident{fy the 
characteristics (~f a target firm that increase the prohahility that the trallsaction will 
ultimately he a success, as measured by the suhseqllent appreciation in the acquirer 's 
stock. It is expected that the characteristics oj a succes.~fi" acquisition are related to 
the targetfirm 's pipeline. Spec{fically, higher quantities ~f late-stage dmgs in the 
target 's pipeline as well as ajoclls on developing biotechllology dmgs are expected 
to lead to superior returnsjor the acquiringjirm 's investors. 
Introduction 
Meeting the goal of maximizing shareholder returns in the pharmaceutical 
indu try i predicated on the firm 's ability to su tain a pipeline of new and innovat ive 
products. ]n attempting to strengthen their product pipelines, pharmaceutical firms 
can essentially pursue two di tinct trategies. The first potential course of action 
involves making long-term investments in internal research and development . The 
second strategy is to strengthen the pipeline by engaging in mergers and acqui itions 
in order to acquire another firm's pipeline of drugs. While the focus of this paper is 
the merger and acquisition strategy, it is helpful to begin with a di cus ion and 
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analysi of so me of the major problem associated w ith the process of ma in taining a 
strong pipeline through internal drug development. 
The Challenges of Internal Growth 
Inve ting in internal research and development presents many cha ll enge with 
no guarantee of developing a successful new drug . The process of bring ing a new 
drug to the market is a long and expen ive one, and the ri k offailure is present at 
every tage of this process. The heavy financial commitment that research and 
developm ent demands al 0 prevents resources from being devoted to other means of 
growing the company and increasing hareholder value that could have more of an 
immediate impact, such a additional expenditures on adverti ing the compa ny' 
drug currently on the market or increasing the dividends paid out to shareholders. 
Despite the e drawbacks, pharmaceutical companies are constantly striving to 
develop the next blockbuster drug through organic re earch and development . 
Regulatory Process 
When a pharmaceutical company decides to make a major in vestment in 
hope of developing a new drug, there is always a great risk that the drug may fail to 
gain the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and thu potentially 
become nothing more than a major sunk cost. The FDA is an agency that is pari of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and it i charged with 
protecting the health of the American public. One of the major responsibilities this 
entails is determining if and when a new drug is afe to be marketed and old to the 
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public. The FDA has received some scathing critici m for over-regulating from 
economists such a the great Milton Friedman, who said that "The FDA has done 
enormou harm to the health of the American public by great ly increa ing the co ts of 
pharmaceutical research, thereby reducing the supply of new and effective drugs, and 
by delaying the approval of such drugs as survive the tortuou FDA proce " (K lein 
2000) . De pite critici ms uch as these, the FDA does play an important role in 
bringing a new drug to market and they will continue to inten ely scrutinize any drug 
before it reaches the public. This inevitably result in a long and costly proce . 
There are even stages involved in bringing a new drug to market (Kellog 
and Charnes 2000) . The fir t stage is discovery, where researchers identify promising 
new molecular entities (NMEs) . If the compound ha promise it then enters the 
regulatory process. The process of gaining FDA approval starts with pre-clinical . 
trial . In tage two of the process the compound is closely scrutinized and tested in 
vilro, which literally tran lates to " in the glas ." At this tage additional te tare 
done, generally in te t tubes or petri dishes . If this part of the pre-clinical trial goes 
well , they enter stage three where animal testing will begin to determine if the drug i 
safe to proceed to the clinical trial stage (stage four) . Less than 1 % of the compounds 
that enter the pre-clinical trials make it to the human testing that take place in the 
clinical stage (Grabowski 2002) . 
For those drugs that do manage to survive these pre-clinical trials, there is an 
even more intense process ahead in the stage three clinical trials . There are three 
phases in the clinical trial process. Phase 1 of the clinical trials entails giving a mall 
dose of the compound being tested to a very small sample size of humans. Generally, 
3 
the sample ize in Phase 1 consists of healthy adult , and the purpose i to determine 
the appropriate do e that should be g iven as the effect the drug ha o n the body. If 
the Pha e I tests do not rai e any red flags, the compound proceed to Pha e II. 
Phase IT i where the majority of failures occur, as it is the first time that the full dose 
is g iven to humans, and the sample size is again increased . The amp le in thi phase 
usuall y con i ts of adults who have the condition the drug is intended to treat. For 
tho e compou nd that do survive Phase II , Phase llL is the most expensive tage, a 
re ult of the length and intensity of the trials in the phase. The sample size is 
enlarged in an attempt to increase the chances that the benefits will be determi ned to 
be tatistically significant. If all goes well in Phase Lll , the company submits a ew 
Drug Application ( DA) to the FDA, who will inform the developing company if 
they may begin to market the drug to the public. This clinical trial proces is both 
expen ive and time consuming, and only 22% of the compounds that enter thi 
proce s ultimately ucceed in gaining the FDA' s approval (Grabowski 2002) . Once 
the drug can finally be marketed, the company enters the final post-approval stage, 
where they continue to monitor and research the newly approved drug . 
This demonstrates that researching and developing a new drug and 
succe sfull y bringing it to market is extremely difficult, and in this proces the take 
are high . Thi is because developing a new drug is an extremely costly endeavor. 
Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen and Henry Grabowski (2003) found that the average 
out-of-pocket cost of developing a new drug is $403 million (DiMa i et al. 2003). 
This fi gure is before expenditure for marketing and other co ts associated with 
finally bringing a new drug to the market, assuming it is one of the fortunate few that 
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ever make it that far . For those select drug that are eventually marketed and 
distributed to the public, the total cost is, on average, in exce of$800 million . 
For those new drugs that do succeed in gaining the FDA' s approval and make 
it to market, there i a limited window in which these drugs can really produce strong 
revenues for the developing firm . This is because on average the e new drug only 
enjoy an eight year effective patent life in which to recoup the costs of development 
and make the firm profitable. A drug ' s effective patent law life is the time that drug 
is under patent protection after reaching the market. Although patents for new 
pharmaceuticals generally last for twenty years, the time that it take to te t and 
develop those drugs counts against the patent's life . Since it takes on average twelve 
years to bring a drug to market, that drug is only on the market and enjoying patent 
protection for eight years before generic competition is allowed to enter the market. 
This generic competition forces the developing firm to drastically reduce their prices, 
since once other firms can just copy the compound it is extremely cheap to 
manufacture the drugs. 
DecisionfoJ" Inlernal Developmenl 
As the FDA approval process suggests, the decision facing a pharmaceutical 
firm present a complex capital budgeting problem. Kellogg and Charnes (2000) 
developed a model that can help value drug development projects. They calculated 
that the expected net present value (ENPV) of a drug is 
(I) 
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The PY estimation has two di tinct cash fl ows: the first is w here the 
pharmaceutical is making cash outlays during the develop ment tage (OCF) of the 
drug and the second is where the pharmaceutical is receiving cash inflows from 
commercial ucces (CCF) . At each stage, where i is an index of the seven stages of 
drug development, there is the conditional probability Pi that the drug wi ll succeed at 
the end tage for a drug that i in stage i-I . qj is the probability of uccess once the 
drug makes it to market. Kellogg and Charne di vi ded the degrees of uccess into 
five categorie ranging from "dog" to " breakthrough." T is when all future cash 
flow fa ll s to zero. In the OCF this happens when the drug reaches the next stage, 
while in the CCF this occurs at the expiration of the patent. Each period has its own 
di count rate. rd is the di count rate for development cash flows while rc is the 
discount rate for commercialized cash flows . Kellogg and Charnes u ed six and nine 
percent for the discount rate for the development and commercialized stages, 
respectively. As Kellogg and Charnes discuss, this model can be u ed to value each 
of the projects in a potential target ' s pipeline, which can then lead to a va luation of 
the firm as a w hole. 
For the purposes of this paper, it will be helpful to modify the equation 
presented by Kellogg and Charnes. This modification will allow u to analyze a 
project in a firm's pipeline during the patent stage and during the post-patent stage 
separatel y. This will take into account that just because a drug loses its patent 
protection, the revenues a firm derives from that drug do not fall to zero. Prices often 
are dramatically slashed, but the firm will often to continue to produce that drug and 
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ell it under the same name, albeit at a g reat discount. The econd term of equation I 
above i modified and presented below. 
~ s . (~T CCFP ) + (LN CCFe ) ENPV = P7 L.t= l q} L.. t= l (1+r)t g = T+l (1+r)9 
(2) 
Where CCFp is the ca h flow during the patent life and CCFc; is the cash flow during 
the generi c period . 
As a drug in the pipeline completes a stage of development, it become more 
valuab le, as the probability of it ultimately reaching the market increases. Thi ha 
the effect of enhancing the overall value of the firm, as the value of a pharmaceutical 
company is ultimately deri ved from the value of it future drug . Through valuing an 
entire firm ' s pipeline, it is po sible to attempt to value the entire firm . Thi help 
offer the firm some guidance and certainty when trying to determine how much they 
should be wi lling to pay to make a potential deal worthwhile for their inve tors . 
Clearly, for pharmaceutical companies looking for future ources of revenu e, 
investing in research and development in hopes of bolstering the firm ' s own pipeline 
is not always a reliable strategy. The process of developing new compounds and 
getting them approved can take fourteen years or longer and is extremel y expensive. 
Further, failures, particularly in the later stages, can lead to gaps in the pipeline which 
wi 11 d i sru pt a fi rm' s revenue stream as other drugs come off patent. These factors 
make growing revenues at a consistent rate and increasing hareholder value 
extremel y difficult. 
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Given the many problems associated with inve tments in re earch and 
development, it is not surprising that pharmaceutical companies have often looked for 
other way to compensate for gaps in the pipeline and to help maintain their expected 
revenues. All indication are that mergers and acquisition will remain a key trategy 
in the pharmaceutical sector for the foreseeable future . 
Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical rndustry 
The pharmaceutical industry is an ideal industry in which to study mergers 
and acqui itions. This is because it is an important international industry 
compromised of many firms engaged in fierce competition, and they develop 
extremely important products with the potential to save and improve countless lives. 
There i also great diversity with regard to the size of these firms, as sizes range from 
some extremely small firms which operate mostly locally and are privately held to 
enormous international firms such as Pfizer, Inc., which has global revenues of nearly 
$50B. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, these firm con tantly face 
pressure to innovate and bring new drugs to the market. One of the result of this 
pre sure is that firms of all sizes in the pharmaceutical indu try have frequently 
engaged in mergers and acquisitions as a way to maintain their revenue streams and 
increase shareholder value. 
The pharmaceutical industry is also an extremely complex ector that is 
constantly faced with both short-term and long-term challenges and uncertainties. 
The expiration of a key patent on a blockbuster drug and the subsequent generic 
competition can devastate a firm's previously most reliable ource of revenue. 
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Maintaining a pipeline of drug that will drive revenues in the future is far from 
guaranteed . As discussed previou ly, new drugs are costly and time-con uming to 
develop, and the vast majority of potential new drugs fail to gain the Food and Drug 
Administration ' approval and thus never reach the market. From the start of the 
development process it take a new drug over ten years to reach the market, and less 
than one out of every hundred compounds that are studied in the preclinical stage ever 
make it to human testing. Further, only one in five of the drug that do make it to 
human testing succeed in gaining FDA approval (Grabowski 2002) . A failed drug 
leaves the firm with nothing to show for their time and resources invested in the 
project. 
The industry also experiences seemingly endless political uncertainty, as "big 
pharma" and their allegedly outrageous profits i always an easy target for 
grandstanding politicians. These political attacks increase the uncertainty regarding 
the potential for future drugs currently being researched and developed to provide 
strong revenues if and when they ultimately reach the market. The current healthcare 
reform debate is merely the latest in a long line of government attempts to get more 
involved in the healthcare system to the detriment of pharmaceutical companies. 
These debates always increase the doubt about whether the drugs currently in a firm's 
pipeline will be adequate to meet analysts' and investors' expectation even if there 
are no unexpected failures . This added uncertainty further pressures pharmaceutical 
companies to have a strong pipeline of drugs that will reach the market and succeed . 
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Acquisition Theories 
There is a great deal of literature that discusses the motivation for 
acqUi itions in the pharmaceutical industry and offers various exp lanations for why 
there are so many pharmaceutical mergers and acquisitions. Some of this li terature 
argues that the synergies that can be created from bring ing two firms together are a 
driver of merger activity. For example, William Pursche, an advisor to companies in 
a variety of sectors and a veteran of over three hundred merger and acquisitions, 
argues that in the pharmaceutical indu stry, "for com panies that can capture co t 
synergies through acquisitions there are considerable opportunities to create value" 
(Pursche 1996). This can indeed be the case, although most of the benefits that come 
with synergie are recognized in the short term. However, there can also be some 
eriou inefficiencies when the two firms first come together that can have the effect 
of offsetting some of the benefits from shorter term synergies. 
There is some management literature that argues that manager' s egos can be a 
reason for all the mergers . The argument is that top executive want to run the largest 
and most powerful company possible. This desire can cloud a manager ' s judgment 
and lead them to believe that they will be able to succeed where many mergi ng 
pharmaceutical firms before them have failed . In criticizing the merger talks between 
GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham that would ultimately create 
GlaxoS mithKline, Fortune ran an article in which Glaxo COO Sean Lance criticized 
the process, declaring that " megalomania seems to be the driving force of these 
merger . Egos are taking precedence over future strategies" (Guyon 1998) . Given 
this, it is not surprising that the GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham merger has 
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been roundly criticized for creating a larger but less uccessful company which has 
failed to produce higher shareholder returns (Heracleou and Murray 2001) . 
Other scholars believe that firms in this industry merge to diversify the drugs 
which are providing the bulk of their revenue. Pfizer Chief Executive Officer Jeff 
Kindler explained his company ' s $68B acqui ition of Wyeth by saying that, "this deal 
is about transforming our company into a more diversified busine s, and to providing 
[ ic] real focus and accountability across those businesses" (Chiang 2009) . Mergers 
can be a valuable way to prevent a firm from becoming overly dependent on one 
blockbuster drug, and therefore the firm will be in a position to better handle the 
inevitable patent expiration and subsequent generic competition that one key drug 
will eventually face . Further, Vasudevan Ramanujam and P. Varadarajan explain that 
" the ri ing co t of internal development. . . has rendered acquisition-ba ed 
diversification increasingly attractive to firms" (Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989). 
While all these theories seem to make some sense, the one key motivation for 
merger and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry are pipeline related . In this 
industry, a firm ' s pipeline is absolutely critical. The pipeline receives intense 
scrutiny from analysts and rating agencies, because the quality of the pipeline is 
extremely significant in knowing if the company will be able to pay back its debt 
and grow their revenue in the future when their key current drugs come off patent. 
Therefore, firms in this industry turn to mergers and acquisitions when there are gap 
in their pipeline due to late-stage and unexpected failures . As Simon Frantz 
explained, pharmaceutical mergers are "driven by losing major patents and not having 
enough drugs in their pipelines to fill the gaps" (Frantz 2006) . 
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Advantages and Drawbacks of Acquisitions 
Acqlfiring Firm 
Given all the problems and potential pitfall that go along with trying to 
ustain revenues through internal research and development, it is not urprising that 
pharmaceutical companies often engage in mergers and acquisitions to help maintain 
trong revenue streams and profits . Bringing two companies together can provide an 
immediate boost to the acquiring firm 's pipeline. This strategy is also the best way 
for a firm to circumvent the long and costly proces of developing a drug from the 
start of the process discussed above through acquiring the promising pipeline of 
another firm . Since some of the drugs in a target firm 's pipeline should be in the later 
stages of testing, there will be a much higher probability of these drugs reaching 
market then if the target had to start from the beginning of the process. These drugs, 
if they do indeed gain FDA approval , will obviously be able to reach the market much 
sooner than if a drug was just starting the proce s, and thus can help compensate for 
whatever patent expirations or late stage failures the acquiring firm has experienced . 
One of the challenges for a firm looking to make an acqui ition is determining 
how much a potential target is worth . As a result of the uncertainty that a drug 
making its way through the development process will make it to market, it can be 
difficult to value a firm ' s pipeline in order to ultimately determine how much the 
acquirer should be willing to pay, even with the model created by Kellogg and 
Charnes (2000) discussed above. 
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Although this all sounds good for the acquiring firm , it rai se an obviou 
question : Why would the e target firms with such promising pipelines want to be 
acquired by another firm troubled with patent expirations and/o r pipeline failures? 
On the urface, it would seem as though a firm with strong future pro pects would be 
better off remaining on it own in order to reap all the benefits when their drugs do 
reach the market. However, there are several reasons why a mall firm with a 
seemingly bright future would want to be acquired . First and foremo t, the acquiring 
firm generally has to pay a significant price to complete the acquisition (Snellgrove 
200 I). This allows the target firm and its shareholders to receive a substantial return 
on their in ve tment. Depending on how the deal is structured, if the shareholders of 
the target fi rm receive shares of the acquiring firm, they still have the opportunity to 
benefit from the new and presumably stronger company. If they receive all ca h for 
their stock in the target firm, then they got a solid return on their investment without 
the risk that they will lose money if there is an unexpected failure in the pipeline. 
This ri sk is always an inherent part of investing in the pharmaceutical industry . 
Further, they always have the option of buying shares in the acquiring firm in the 
open market if they so choose. 
Target firms are also sometimes motivated to be acquired if they are having 
difficulty accessing credit. This problem is exacerbated during difficult economic 
time , and can lead to smaller firms actively looking for another firm that would be 
interested in acquiring them (Schmidt 2008). If a target firm currently does not have 
strong revenues and is not yet a well-established company, they may have problems 
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getting the fund nece ary to continue investing in re earch and development even 
during normal economic times, regardless of how promising their pipeline may be. 
Thi i the re ult of the inherent uncertainty of attempting to bring a drug to market, 
no matter how much revenue that drug might produce if and when it actually reaches 
the public. For firms in this difficult situation, their best option may very well be to 
be acquired by a larger, more established company that has a good deal of cash on 
hand and can more easily access credit. These larger firms generally offer the 
additional benefit of having a stronger system to manufacture and distribute a new 
drug to the public once it is approved by the FDA than the target firm would have on 
its own, as a result of their having gone through the process many times before. 
Drawbacks 
Despite these benefits for both the acquiring and target firms in a 
pharmaceutical merger or acquisition, there are also several potential drawback to 
this strategy that an acquiring firm should be wary of. The most ignificant drawback 
is that the time and effort it takes to bring two different companies together can take 
the focus away from research and development, which can hurt the long-term 
potential of the pipeline. Mergers can also be extraordinarily expensive, which means 
that significant financial resources will have to be committed in order to make the 
merger happen . These are financial resources that might otherwise be devoted to 
research and development that would ensure the future strength of the pipeline. 
Further, bringing two distinct teams of researchers from their own di tinct cultures 
can disrupt innovation, which obviously has a negative effect on the pipeline. 
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The e drawbacks have doomed many mergers in the pharmaceutical indu try . 
These fai lures have ranged from deal s between relati vely small firms to orne of the 
large t and mo t hig h profile mergers that have occurred in recent year . The e 
failures have led many scholars to question if mergers and acquisitions are actuall y an 
effective or even an appropriate strategy for firms hoping to grow revenues and 
increa e hareholder value in thi s industry. One tudy found that "despite the 
attracti veness of mergers in the pharmaceutical indu try, [they found] no abnormal 
returns from mergers for acquiring companies" (Hassan et al. 2007). Another tudy 
goes even further, stating that "there is a general background of evidence to show that 
mergers frequently destroy shareholder values. The pharmaceutical sector is no 
exception" (Heracleous Murray 200 I) . 
Biotechnology Firms and Acquisition Value 
While many studies have examined mergers and acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry, this study will be examining the characteristics of drugs in 
the target firm's pipeline. Specifically, the effect of biotechnology drugs in the 
target ' pipeline will be closely scrutinized . Biotech drugs, unlike traditional 
pharmaceuticals, are produced from living organisms, and thus are more expensive to 
manufacture and distribute than traditional pharmaceuticals. The biotech field is 
currently the fastest growing and most promising area of pharmaceutical re earch . 
Biotech drugs are a relatively new area of pharmaceutical di covery, and as Henry 
Grabowski (2002) explains, they may in the near future be able to reach the market 
faster and achieve higher success rates. This fact , coupled with biotech ' s potential to 
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effectively treat a wide range of serious conditions, ha led to heavy investment in 
the development of biotech drugs. However, Grabow ki concedes that presently, the 
costs of development are no lower and sometimes even higher, and the likelihood of a 
drug reaching the market are no better for biotech drugs than for traditional drug 
(Grabowski 2002) . This is possibly why we do not presently see an ever greater 
percentage of biotech drugs in pharmaceutical pipelines. 
The production of these biotech drugs can be extremely complicated . 
Although the process by which these drugs come to the market after being crutinized 
by the FDA doe not differ materially from the process traditional pharmaceut icals 
undergo, the actual production and manufacturing of these drugs is much different. 
One scholarly article concluded that the result of the complexity of manufacturing 
biotech drugs is higher barriers to entry, which will help reduce the competition once 
the drug lose patent protection (Grabowski et al. 2006) . This would make biotech 
drugs in a target firm ' s pipeline extremely attractive to pharmaceutical companie 
looking to make an acquisition, as their traditional drugs are constantly threatened by 
generic competition. 
The biotech field is an area that holds immense promise and is getting 
significant attention . Due to the incredible potential biotechnology drugs have to 
treat a host of ailment from Alzheimer 's to diabetes, there is a belief that these drugs 
will be major revenue drivers in the future . As it was reported in RusinessJlfieek in 
2005, it seems that "Biotechnology has finally come of age." Pharmaceutical firms 
are making heavy bets that this will indeed be the case, and that biotechnology is the 
future of the industry. This is reflected in the fact that "Biotech increasingly 
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dominate the pipeline (44% of all discovery stage candidates) and has a g rowing 
share of drug applications (about one in ten offiling )" (Lawrence 2005). Indeed, 
numerous mall firms, and even some very large firms uch as Amgen (the large t 
player with revenues in excess of$14 .7B), have been started that focus solel y on the 
development of biotech drugs (Mulligan 2001) . These firms, w ith promi ing bi otech 
drugs in their pipelines, are increasingly becoming attractive targets for 
pharmaceutical companies looking to merge, and pharmaceutical companies are 
increasingl y willing to pay a high price for these biotech companies. Indeed, 
pharmaceutical companies " paying a large premium is fast becoming the industry 
tandard and again reflecting the high demand for biotech companies" (Malik 2009). 
Hypotheses and Relevance for Investors 
If biotech firms do command a premium, investors will want to anticipate the 
merger prior to the announcement when abnormal returns appear to occur. A positive 
market reaction would result in investors in the acquiring firm achieving superior 
returns around the time of the announcement. Previous research has not examined the 
pipeline composition, and it is expected that a close analysis of the target pipeline 
could also help predict the likelihood that the acquisition will be well received by 
market. 
Hig her numbers of drugs in the later stages of development in a target firm ' s 
pipeline would also be expected to increase the returns of the acquiring firm ' s 
investors because these drugs are close to reaching the market and generating revenue 
for the acquirer. It is true that there is still no guarantee of a drug in later stage 
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reaching the market and ultimately being uccessful. However, there i much les 
uncertainty regarding potential to reach the public for a drug that has alread y been 
tested on humans and achieved some good results than there would be with a drug 
still in the pre-clinical stage. Those drugs that are in the early stage of the process 
are longer duration projects, and as Bradford Cornell explains, " longer duration 
projects are ' riskier,' by the sheer fact of their longer duration and, therefore, should 
be discounted at hig her rate " (Cornell 1999). This fact makes those drug in the later 
stages much more valuable than those in the beginning stages of gaining FDA 
approval. 
Potentially even more significant than late stage drugs in the target firm ' s 
pipeline for predicting the likelihood of success in a pharmaceutical merger is a 
biotechnology focus in a target, resulting in biotech drugs in the target firm ' s pipeline . 
As discussed above, there is incredible potential for major profits would come with 
the development of a new biotechnology drug. Given this, it would be expected that 
a biotech focus in a target firm would lead the market to respond positively to a 
biotech acquisition announcement and thus increase the return realized by the 
acquiring firm ' s investors. 
Finally, some financial data will also be included to see if this information can 
help predict the market ' s reaction to an acquisition . The target's research and 
development expenditures for the year prior to the acquisition will be recorded and 
compared to the firm ' s total assets. Dividing the research and development costs by 
the total assets will reveal how focused on organic pipeline development the target 
firm was. Firms value research and development expenditures because it show a 
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commitment to the development of successful new drugs and lays the foundation for 
future revenues . It is bel ieved that targets that put proportionately more of their 
resource into development will be more favorably received by the market. 
Empirical Methodology and Analysis 
In orderto test if a biotechnology focus, late stage drugs in the target firm ' s 
pipeline and strong investments in research and development will indeed lead to 
higher returns for the acquiring firm ' s investors, a two step empirical methodology 
will be used . The first step is known as an event study, a study where the market's 
response in the trading days surrounding a major event is studied . The econd step is 
analyzing the residuals from the event study to see if it can be determined what is 
driving the residuals . The following sections will discuss in detail the various tests . 
run and will analyze the results . 
,)'Iep One: Hvent Study 
Testing the hypotheses put forth in this paper required performing an event 
study, which is any study that measures the impact of a specific event on the 
valuation of a company. There are numerous possibilities for events to be tudied . 
The po sibilities include earnings announcements, the sale of new stock or changes in 
management. In this study, the event will be the official announcement of the 
acquisition . Event studies are helpful, because "given rationality in the marketplace, 
the effect of an event will be reflected immediately in asset price. Thus the event ' s 
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economic impact can be measured using asset prices observed over a relatively shol1 
period of time" (Campbell , Lo and MacKinlay 1997) . 
The actual event in this study will be the day the acqui ition was officially 
announced . n event window to be examined must also be defined, si nce rumor of 
the acquisition could potentially cause abnormal price returns in the trading days 
leading up to the announcement, and there could be post-announcement drift that 
re ults in abnormal returns in the days immediately following the announcement. 
This window should be adequate to capture all the price action that would be a result 
of the acquisition. In this study the event window will start at the eighteenth trading 
day prior to the acquisition announcement and end at the close of the twentieth 
trading day after the announcement. 
Prior to the event window the movement of an acquirer ' stock price i 
assumed to follow the general trend of the industry. A 100 day estimation period was 
used to capture the relationship between the target firm and the industry. Thi is a 
variant of the market model : 
E[EU] = 0 
Var[E it ] = O"Ji 
Rit is the return of acquirer i at time period t, and R m t is the industry return 
for the same period . Eit represents the zero mean disturbance term, and U i ' ~i ' and 
CY~i are the model's parameters. This model shows the expected linear relationship 
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between the individual acquirer ' s performance and the broader performance of the 
pharmaceutical industry (Campbell , Lo and MacKinlay 1997). 
Given this " normal" relationship, the model is used to estimate the expected 
return during the thirty-eight day event period The excess (or "abnormal") return of 
the acquirer ' s stock during event period T is measured 
WhereEtT, RiT and E(RiT) are the abnormal , actual and normal (expected) returns, 
respectively for the event time period T. XT is the conditioning information for the 
normal performance model. Excess residuals for each firm are average for each day 
duri ng the event period: 
"n E* (1) - E-L.. i=O iT X - - T 
n 
Average residuals are summed over time and denoted as the cumulative average 
residuals (CARs) . 
Step 'li-vo: Residual Analysis 
Once the CARs are gathered, regression analysis can be utilized to as ess the 
impact of pipeline composition and maturity on CARs. It is expected that the CARs 
are a function of characteristics of the target firm . The model that will be used is 
presented below. 
R&D + Ili 
Total Assetsi 
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For this study it will be important to control for the type of target and the 
pipeline composition . Also included in the model is the target ' s inve tment in 
research and development. 
Data 
Gathering the Data 
To test the hypotheses, a list of potential acquisitions was generated with the 
help of the Mergent Database, which identifies firms which are no longer actively 
traded. Because of the need for transparency in creating the data set, all targets were 
publicly traded at the time of the announcement, as was the acquiring firm . All of the 
acquisition had occurred fairly recently, as no acquisition on the list had been 
announced farther back than 1999. I The target in each acquisition was classified as 
either a traditional pharmaceutical firm or as a biotechnology firm based on the 
company' s SIC code? This process produced 23 traditional pharmaceutical targets, 
representing 56% of the sample and 18 biotech targets, representing 44% of the 
sample. 
Once the list of targets was created and each firm was classified as either a 
traditional pharmaceutical or a biotech, the pipelines of the targets had to be analyzed . 
To accomplish this, the Mergent Database was again used, this time to obtain each 
target' s annual report for the full year prior to the year the merger was announced . 
1 The ori ginal sa mple contained 45 firms . Three traditional targets and one biotech target were 
excluded from the data set because they showed no statistical significance with the industry index the 
underlyi ng return following the annOlll1cemenl. Firms used in the study are Ii ted in Appendix . 
2 Those targets with an SlC code of2834 were classified as traditional pharmaceuticals and tho e with 
an SIC code of 2836 were classified as biotechs (Golec and Vernon 2009). 
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The e annual report provided pipeline information, and the number of approved 
drugs a well as the number of drug in development wa recorded as well a the 
tage of development for each drug in the pipeline. 
Some relevant financial data for each firm was also recorded . pecificall y, 
the target' research and development expenditures for the year prior to the 
announcement were recorded to see iffirms who had made a heavy commitment to 
re earch received any premium. To put the research costs in the proper perspecti ve, 
the target's total assets were also recorded . This allowed a variable to be created that 
wou ld take into consideration the different sizes of the targets when determi ning how 
signifi cant the investments in research were. For a complete breakdown of the 
variabl es co ll ected from the annual reports, see Table-\ below. 
Table-l 
o f V . bl escnptlOn 0 ana es 
Variable Description 
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in 
Prec the preclinical stage of development 
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in 
pi phase' of clinical development 
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in 
p2 phase II of clinical development 
Number of drugs in the target's pipeline in 
p3 phase "' of clinical development 
Number of the target's drugs that have 
App received FDA approval 
Dummy variable where 0 is a traditional 
Biot pharmaceutical and 1 is a biotech . 
Target's expenditures on research & 
development for the year prior to the 
Rd acquisition announcement 
Target' s total assets reported for the year 
Ta prior to the acquisition announcement 
Target's research & development divided by 
Rdta the total assets 
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Stock price information for the acquirer as well as for a pharmaceutical index 
wa collected . The index chosen is the AMEX Pharmaceutical Index, which trades 
under the ticker symbol DRG. Thi index is designed to mirror the equity 
performance of the pharmaceutical sector. In collecting stock price data, for both 
each acquiring firm and the index close prices were recorded for each of the eighteen 
trading days prior to the announcement of the acquisition, the close price on the day 
the acqui ition was announced and the close price for each of the twenty days after 
the announcement. The logarithms for the recorded closing prices for both the 
acquiring firms and the index were then calculated, as these are proxies for asset 
returns. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The mean for drugs in the pipeline in the preclinical stage of development was 
slightly over three, while the average number of approved drugs was under two. It i 
also interesting to note the wide range in research and development expenditures and 
total assets observed in the sample. The ratio of research and development to total 
assets also speaks to the wide variation in the size of the targets. The target with the 
highest ratio spent a staggering 32 times more on research and development than the 
firm had in total assets. This reflects the fact that the sample captured firms of greatly 
different sizes. For further details about the data, see the descriptive table for the 
variables in Table-2, below. 
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Table-2 
D . f St f f escnp Ive a IS ICS 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
prec 3.22 0 13 
pI 2 .07 0 9 
p2 2.20 0 17 
p3 2 .02 0 19 
app 1.90 0 34 
biot 0.439 0 1 
Rd (millions) 120.42 7.57 1,259 
ta (millions) 692 .55 4,500 11 ,442 
rdta 1.134 0.098 32.289 
Empirical Results 
Calculating (' AR 
To determine how the market is responding to acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry, the returns in each acquisition had to be compared to the 
returns observed in the broad pharmaceutical index . This process had several tep . 
First, the industry index performance was used to predict the performance of each 
individual acquirer's stock . The deviation in the acquirer 's actual performance, 
called the residual, was then calculated for each day observed . The ob ervations for 
the acquirers of traditional pharmaceutical targets were then epa rated from the 
information on the acquirers of biotech firms . For both of these groups the residuals 
could then be accumulated so that the net abnormal returns could be analyzed . This 
was accomplished by simply summing the individual residuals for every day 
proceeding the day being analyzed . These net abnormal returns are known as the 
cumulative average residuals . 
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Once the cumulative average residual were calculated, the average 
cumulative average residuals for each day could be calculated for both the traditional 
and biotech targets . This was accomplished by averaging the cumulative average 
residual for each acquiring firm across each day. It is expected that the CARs will 
be near zero for the days leading up to the event, that is that investor will on average 
over time will not receive a return other than what is the normal market return . 
However, the e residuals could differ after the announcement depending on the 
reactions of the market to the information in the announcement. Any ignificant 
CARs in the time leading up to the announcement could indicate that investors are 
trading on rumors of the announcement. It is also expected that the CAR will be 
higher for firms acquiring biotechs that for those acquiring traditional pharmaceutical 
firm , ince there may be cash flow advantages in the biotech generic market. The . 
comparison will allow us to evaluate how the market is responding to biotech target 
as compared to their traditional counterparts. The results are pre ented in Graph-I 
below. 3 
3 The table of daily average residuals and CARs are presented in Appendix I. 
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Interestingly, the graph shows that the CARs begin to trend higher for the 
firms acquiring traditional targets right away. This suggests that buying on rumors is 
occurring. There is less of a move before the announcement for the biotech acquirers, 
perhaps because with some of the smaller biotech firm there i les media scrutiny 
and fewer rumors are leaked . The strong performance of the traditional acquirers 
refutes the notion that the market has become generally negative on pharmaceutical 
acquisitions and will thus knock the stock of the acquiring firm down . However, in 
the days following the announcement, the performance of acqu irers of traditional 
pharmaceutical firms begins to level off, whereas the biotech acquirers really begin to 
see positive abnormal returns. By the twentieth day following the announcement, the 
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abnormal return for each type of acquirer is similar, sugge ting that the acquirers of 
biotech firm s are not seeing higher returns than the acquirer of traditional targets. 
The next step in the process wa to determine if the re uIts were statisticall y 
significant. To determine significance, the available data was used to calculate the 
tandard error. From this the J I statistic, used to determine statistical significance, 
was calculated by dividing the average cumulative average residual by the standard 
error. The results for the acquirers of traditional firms reveal that the results are 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval for the entire event window. 
For the biotech acquirers, the results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
interval for the first five days of the event window, then lose their statistical 
significance until the third day before the announcement. The results then remain 
significant at the 99% confidence interval for the duration of the event window. 
Pipeline Impact on (' ARs 
Four regression models were run in order to see if it could be determined what 
factors the market values in a target firm when pricing the acquirer. The first of these 
regressions was for the eighteenth trading day prior to the announcement of the 
acquisition . The second was the day of the announcement and the third was for the 
twentieth day after the announcement. The fourth model took the firms ' average 
CARs for the five days immediately after the acquisition was announced . The results 
are in Table-3 below. 
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Table-3 
Impact of Firm's Pipeline on CARs for Particular Days during Event Window 
Variable -18 -18* o 0* 20 20* 5 day 5 day 
aver. aver. * 
Prec 
::::::::·::pi':. 
p2 
::::-.,: u:p?l. 
0.00185 0.76 0.01541 0.34 0.04641 0.50 
O.odri885.9 '::'~~ltol1s'I(.: h:;b9.642:::::",lh .. 4.t" A;ih9155I:; .. ·:1.1:0.. 
..... ," . ':::;:;.: ...•.. , ......... :/ .•. - ,", .......... . ... -.. :::". .. 
0.02183 
,0 .104 · 
0.00308 0.68 0.10612 1.28 0.20904 1.23 0 .13242 
.' b . :bi228·::::;:::::::t2!83 :::II:::6j26:f5:3:?:~:: 3l'2~#:':'Oi4:16I4 ::I::;'t2 ;65 ::;' 0;3·0521 " 
::;: ,.::.::;:":;::::"" "::::::::::::;: :::;.::;:;:;:::::::::::::;::::::. ;:::::;:;.;:;:::;:;::.,:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:; ':::>:;:::;::'::. ::"" ....... "::.::-:.;. ":.;.;.:. :-:.: :.;:; :,:.:... . . .. 
0.42 
.. " 1.07 
1.38 
3.31' 
App -0.00211 -1.14 -0.0746 -2.19 -0 .131 -1 .87 -0.09088 -2.31 
...... ':):Siot '/\:::": -olb:i:i-66. ;::::!::::::;O.i6~·::::}::::4'Ll.2.:.i1S.:.nJ, i~ l i.l.: :.: .. }:. ;13;Q8?:I:{::&4 ;42:: .::' -0. • .85229:.:: .•. "C-2.16 .,. 
......... .•... ' .•... :.:.: .. :-:.:.: ,", .. 
Rdta 0.00118 0.70 0.0497 1.61 0.11006 1.72 0.05814 1.62 
:;:; S,~!fI~le {;.: .. :::::.:":r;s.: ::>::;::::{;\;::{{;:::}>::::;::}:::?::;{:;;;;;;;~y>,{{,;,:(:::.. .:::AX .';'; 41· 
R-sq 0.484 0.641 0.568 
:::·:!.\.~J.f. ~t~q I.: .... dl$11: .. :::m:,:·:::::.:.;:.::::~:::;:;:~;:.:·:.:::.:,:,:::::R;:~65:.::I:::;;:tt :::':;):: ::::::2,116 .. . .. 
*t-statistics 
The first column for each day how the variable ' s coefficient while the 
second column shows its t-value. The results reveal that for the eighteenth trading ' 
day before the announcement of the acquisition the model can explain less than 40% 
of the observed variation . However, the day of the announcement the model 's ability 
to explain the variation jumps to slightly over 56%. The average of the five days 
after the announcement is the strongest model , predicting ju t over 57% of the 
variation. By the twentieth day after the announcement, the model ' s ability to explain 
the observed CARs is back below 50%. 
In looking at the individual variables, the market seems to value the Phase lIT 
drugs, while not valuing projects in the earlier stage of development. The value of 
the coefficient on the Phase HI drugs also continuously rises as it gets later in the 
event window. This is not surprising, given that Phase HI drugs are close to reaching 
the market and thus face less uncertainty than the drugs in the earlier stage of 
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development. 1t is interesting that the market seems to even value Pha e III drug 
more than drugs already approved, perhaps becau e the patent on those drugs has 
already began to run out, while Phase III drugs will enjoy a longer period of 
protection . Although drugs in the earlier stages of development are not statistically 
ignificant, it is interesting to note that the coefficients do grow for each stage of 
development a the drug gets closer to the market. The coefficients for drug in the 
preclinical stage are particularly small , not surprising given the tremendous rate of 
failure at that stage. 
The ratio comparing the target's research and development expenditure to 
total as ets does not have much of an impact on how the market values the acquirer. 
This does make sense, because the market will value the successes of the research 
ba ed on the projects, particularly the later stage projects, in the pipeline. The market 
is not rewarding a commitment to high expenditures on research . 
Con istent with the results found in Graph-I , the model shows that the market 
is not giving a premium for biotech acquisitions. This could possibly be a result of 
the high price acquirers of biotech firms have to pay since, as discussed above, 
biotech firms often sell for a premium. This could weigh down the acquirer's 
performance in the wake of the acquisition announcement. 
Conclusion 
There is a great deal of room for additional research on this subject. Future 
studies may want to examine whether the market values acquisitions between two 
firms who have collaborated on the development of a drug in the past. The market 
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may value thi pa t collaboration since the firm ' s are already familiar with each other 
and have worked successfully in the past, creating a familiarity that may ea e the 
transition that i sometimes difficult. 
Future research may also want to consider using a longer time horizon when 
analyzing an acquirer ' performance. The relatively short time horizon utilized in 
thi study was appropriate for an event study, but it would be interesting to ee if the 
pipeline information would have an effect over the longer term performance of the 
acquirer . Testing this could be made more difficult by firms that frequently make 
acquisition . One other possible avenue for future research could be to analyze the 
therapeutic class of the drugs in development. Thi would reveal whether the market 
values firms that focus on developing drugs that treat conditions that tend to be very 
profitable. 
In a fiercely competitive industry such as the pharmaceutical industry, 
acquisition will likely remain a key strategy for firm looking to maintain their 
revenues for the foreseeable future . Given this, it would benefit investors to have 
more information about what characteristics the market values in a target firm so that 
they can invest their capital wisely. Hopefully future research will be able to hed 
additional light on this question . 
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Appendix-l 
Traditional Biotech 
Event 
Day Individual Day CAR J1 Ind ividual Day CAR J1 
-18 -0.0142020 -0.0142021 N/A -0.014202069 0 .0067042 N/A 
-17 -0.015130677 
-0.02933 27 -38.4162 -0 .015130677 0 .0114027 5.163583 
-16 -0. 017891411 
-0 .0472242 -41.2695 -0 .017891411 0.0107209 3.686395 
-15 -0.017092019 -0 .0643162 -53.1054 -0 .017092019 0 .0106867 3.325546 
-14 -0.016228336 
-0.0805445 -56.9067 -0 .016228336 0.012289 3.460265 
-13 -0.016414787 -0.0969593 
-66.3438 -0 .016414787 0 .0148435 3.74658 
-12 -0.017514267 -0.1144736 -71.0741 -0.017514267 0.00966 23 1.925208 
-11 -0.013035384 
-0.1275089 -65 .9513 -0 .013035384 0 .0022185 0.438084 
-10 -0.010581326 -0.1380903 -66.1675 -0.0105813 26 -0 .0023 179 -0.4566 
-9 -0.010967438 
-0.1490577 -70.3769 -0.010967438 -0.0047723 -0.84423 
-8 -0.01334873 
-0.1624064 -76.3568 -0.01334873 -0.0063067 -1. 04058 
-7 -0.014089228 -0 .1764957 -82.2683 
-0.014089228 -0.0037703 -0.55904 
-6 -0.011811327 
-0.188307 -84.9 
-0 .011811327 -0.0019065 -0.27448 
-5 -0 .011770587 -0.2000776 -85 .5006 -0.011770587 -0.0038999 -0.56965 
-4 -0.013558449 -0.213636 -85 .3342 -0.013558449 -0.0145586 -2.13856 
-3 
-0.010114095 -0 .2237501 -85 .2569 
-0 .010114095 -0 .0 278063 -4.09905 
-2 -0.011974309 
-0 .2357244 -84.3494 
-0.011974309 -0.0420362 -6.19702 
-1 
-0.014151906 -0 .2498763 -84.5134 
-0.014151906 -0.0531999 -7.86152 
0 -0.007710816 -0.2575872 -85 .8166 -0 .007710816 -0 .0567263 -8. 32509 
1 -0.007834152 -0.2654213 -86.743 
-0.007834152 -0 .06 22641 -9.09948 
2 -0.007292702 -0 .272714 -88.1353 -0.007292702 -0.0644641 -9.38433 
3 -0.006727243 -0 .2794413 -89.3915 -0 .006727243 -0 .0637611 -9.37 264 
4 -0.00811032 -0 .2875516 -91.0823 -0 .00811032 -0 .0578101 -8.58538 
5 -0.008302205 -0.2958538 -93 .2065 -0.008302205 -0 .0584233 -8 .79201 
6 -0.006883048 -0.3027368 -95 .1462 -0.006883048 -0.061737 -9.38253 
7 -0.004038273 -0.3067751 -94.0251 
-0.004038273 -0.0816071 -11.1241 
8 -0.005150245 -0.3119253 -93 .6879 -0.005150245 -0 .0994207 -12.8783 
9 -0.006628577 -0.3185539 -95.5436 -0.006628577 -0.1157829 -14.273 
10 -0.003945307 -0.3224992 -95.5941 
-0.003945307 -0.130636 -15. 767 
11 -0.003612651 -0.3261119 -95.4538 
-0.003612651 -0 .1486653 -17.7732 
12 -0.003717322 -0.3298292 -95.8569 
-0.003717322 -0 .1638315 -19.7051 
13 -0.005093876 -0.3349231 -97.5159 -0.005093876 
-0.1825062 -21.9234 
14 -0.002540888 -0.337464 -97.3696 
-0 .002540888 
-0 .209045 -24.5943 
15 -0.001329242 -0.3387932 -96.8241 
-0.001329242 -0.2347301 
-27.0416 
16 -0.001334373 -0.3401276 -96.6595 
-0 .001334373 
-0.2584567 -29.3946 
17 -0.000457038 -0.3405846 -95 .7409 
-0.000457038 
-0 .2777212 
-31.4305 
18 -0.000204411 -0.340789 -94.2191 
-0 .000204411 
-0.2956295 
-33 .355 
19 -0.002218695 -0 .3430077 -94.3336 
-0.002218695 
-0.3159929 -35.4582 
20 -0.000261427 -0 .3432692 -93.8397 
-0 .000261427 
-0.3378583 
-37.7524 
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Mergers in the Sample 
Label Acquirer Target 
ml Abbott Labs Kos Pharma 
m2 Alza Crescendo 
m3 Bristol Myers-Squibb Medarex 
m6 Chiron Matrix Pharmaceutical 
m7 Eli Li lIy lcos 
m8 Eli Lilly SGX 
m9 Eli Lilly Applied Molecular 
ml0 Genzyme GelTex Pharma 
mll Genzyme AnorMed 
m12 Gilead Myogen 
m13 Indevus Valera 
m14 Johnson & Johnson Cougar 
m15 Johnson & Johnson 3-Dimensional Pharma 
m16 Merck Sibia 
m17 Merck Sirna 
m18 Millennium COR Therapeutics 
m20 Pfizer Warner-Lambert Co. 
m21 Pfizer Encysive 
m22 Pfizer Vicuron 
m23 Pfizer Coley 
m24 Pfizer Esperion 
m25 Shire New River Pharma 
m26 Warner-Lam bert Agouron Pharma 
m27 Amgen Abgenix 
m28 Amgen Immunex 
m29 AstraZeneca Medlmmune 
m30 AstraZeneca Cambridge Antibody Tech. 
m31 Bristol Myers-Squibb Kosan Biosciences 
m32 Bristol Myers-Squibb Medarex 
m33 Corixa Ribi ImmunoChem 
m34 Elan Liposome 
m35 Eli Lilly ImCione 
m37 Genzyme Sangstat 
m38 Genzyme Osiris 
m39 GlaxoSmithKline Corixa 
m40 GlaxoSmithKline ID Biomed 
m41 Johnson & Johnson Omrix 
m42 Medlmmune Aviron 
m43 Merck Serono 
m44 Pharmacia Sugen 
m45 Shire Transkaryotic Therapies 
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